



POLICY

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

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7 JUN 1983

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In Reply Refer To
I-20139/83

Mr. John N. McMahon
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC. 20505

OSD review completed

Dear John,

(S) In response to your memorandum of 19 May on National Intelligence Topics, we have requested inputs for the 1983 NITs of Current Interest from the Secretaries of the Military Departments and senior OSD policy level officials. Because our total departmental submission to you is to be limited to no more than five questions, I am writing to request that you confirm our understanding, as described below, of the manner in which the NITs will be assembled and promulgated this year.

- Each of the SIG(I) principals, less the DCI, and plus the three additional departmental secretaries represented on the SIG(I) Committee on Priorities (Treasury, Commerce, and Energy) will be strictly limited to an input of up to five questions. The final NITs list will thus include no more than 35 questions.
- Unless this discipline is really enforced, those who disregard the numbers limit you have set could be far better represented in the NITs publication than those who follow the rules. This occurred last year, when a single organization made inputs to about three-fourths of the numbered NITs paragraphs.
- The DCI would not submit any NITs questions since the NITs are intended to reflect the needs of policy level users of intelligence.
- Since each organization submitting NITs can offer no more than five, their inputs will be included in the NITs document without reformatting, consolidation with inputs from other organizations, or other change.
- It is important that the intelligence production organizations know what the Defense Department considers are its most critical near-term intelligence needs, what State does, what Treasury does, etc.
- Promulgating what each organization submits exactly as drafted by that organization may reflect some degree of overlap, but this could itself be of value to intelligence analysts for they would be aware, for instance, how the information needs of Defense and State differ even when they are discussing the same general subject.

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Declassify on: OADR

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
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- This system avoids the risk of markedly altering the thrust of a NITs proposed by a particular department so as to accommodate a different approach to the topic on the part of another organization.
- NITs published as provided by the users would clearly indicate what the major users consider they need rather than how the intelligence officers who put the final document together consider those needs ought to be described.

(U) This manner of assembling the 1983 NITs will, in our view, make the end document of more practical use to intelligence analysts and producers and clearly give the users of intelligence who submit NITs responsibility for their identification and formulation.



Richard G. Stilwell
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy

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